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Michael Tonry
Sentencing Commissions and
Their Guidelines
ABSTRACT
Sentencing commissions, administrative agencies charged to develop and
promulgate standards for sentencing, were first proposed early in the
1970s and first established in 1978. Of four recent major sentencing
reform approaches-the others being parole guidelines, voluntary
sentencing guidelines, and statutory determinate sentences-only
sentencing commission systems continue to be created. Despite
controversies associated with the highly unpopular federal guidelines,
commissions and their guidelines have achieved their primary goals. Some
commissions have achieved specialized technical competence, have
adopted comprehensive policy approaches, and have to a degree insulated
policy from short-term political pressures. Guidelines have reduced
disparities and gender and sex differences in sentencing and by tying
policies to available resources have enabled some jurisdictions to resist
national trends toward greatly increased prison populations.
The sentencing commission is alive and well. Proposed by Judge Mar-
vin Frankel more than twenty years ago as a device for reducing sen-
tencing disparities and judicial "lawlessness," sentencing commissions
were to be specialized administrative agencies charged to set standards
for sentencing (Frankel 1972). Some commissions have operated much
as Judge Frankel hoped they would; they have achieved and maintained
specialized institutional competence, have to a degree insulated sen-
tencing policy from short-term "crime of the week" political pressures,
and have maintained a focus on comprehensive system-wide policy-
making. Guidelines promulgated by commissions have altered sentenc-
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ing patterns and practices, have reduced sentencing disparities and
gender and race effects, and have shown that sentencing policies can
be linked to correctional and other resources, thereby enhancing gov-
ernmental accountability and protecting the public purse.
Many readers may be surprised by the preceding summary of experi-
ence with sentencing commissions and their guidelines. The controver-
sial story of the best-known commission, the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission, is well known. The U.S. commission's guidelines are easily
the most disliked sentencing reform initiative in the United States in
this century. They are commonly criticized on policy grounds (that
they unduly limit judicial discretion and unduly shift discretion to
prosecutors), on process grounds (that they foreseeably cause judges
and prosecutors to devise hypocritical stratagems to circumvent them),
on technocratic grounds (that they are too complex and are hard to
apply accurately), on fairness grounds (that by taking only offense
elements and prior criminal history into account, very different defen-
dants receive the same sentence), and on normative grounds (that they
greatly increased the proportion of offenders receiving prison sentences
and are generally too harsh). How, a reader might reasonably ask, can
the commission idea be a success if its most prominent example is so
controversial?
The answer is that the experience of the U.S. commission is mis-
leading in two ways. First, the federal commission is but one of twenty
that have been established and of a dozen or more now in existence.
In some states, notably including Delaware, Minnesota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, the experience has been much happier.
Second, and as important for assessment of the viability of Judge Fran-
kel's proposal, the evidence documenting the policy failures and un-
popularity of the U.S. guidelines at the same time demonstrates the
institutional capacities of sentencing commissions. However misguided
the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policies, and however ineffective
its efforts to elicit acceptance from practitioners, it has become a spe-
cialized agency of technical competence and has managed through its
guidelines radically to alter sentencing practices in the federal courts.'
The sentencing commission idea will survive the federal debacle. To
be sure, the federal example raises skepticism in many states. In both
North Carolina and Texas, for example, commissions at early meetings
IThis point, that an increasingly effective organization is behind the deeply unpopu-
lar federal guidelines, is obvious enough once noted but has long gone unnoted. Doob
(1993) pointed it out to me, and I have developed the idea elsewhere (Tonry 1993a).
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adopted resolutions expressly repudiating the federal guidelines as a
model for anything they might develop (Knapp 1993). The North
Carolina commission euphemistically abjured use of the word "guide-
lines" in its legislative proposals (North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Commission 1993) so as not to conjure up images of the
federal guidelines (Orland and Reitz 1993). At a meeting of state sen-
tencing commissions in Boulder, Colorado, in February 1993, an Ohio
representative reported that the Ohio commission early in its work
resolved that "Ohio should not adopt the type of rigid sentencing
guidelines exemplified by the federal guidelines" (Orland and Reitz
1993). State policymakers can and do distinguish the merits and prom-
ise of Judge Frankel's proposal from the demerits and policy failures
of the U.S. federal experience.
Sentencing reform remains on the policy agendas of many common
law jurisdictions in the United States and elsewhere. The Criminal
Justice Act 1991, which took effect in October 1992, is a major recon-
stitution of sentencing laws and practices in England and Wales (Wasik
and Taylor 1991; Ashworth 1992; Thomas 1993). In Australia, al-
though the 1980 call of the Australian Law Reform Commission for
abolition of parole fell on deaf ears, in 1989 New South Wales (Gorta
1992, 1993) enacted truth-in-sentencing laws not greatly different from
those in some American states; in 1991 Victoria enacted the Sentencing
Act of 1991, which made significant changes to that state's sentencing
laws (Fox 1991; Freiberg 1993). Although the 1987 recommendation
of a Canadian national commission that Canada establish a permanent
sentencing commission was not adopted by the Canadian Parliament
(Canadian Sentencing Commission 1987, chap. 14), major sentencing
reform legislation has been repeatedly considered (see, e.g., Roberts
and von Hirsch 1993).
In American states, the sentencing commission is the only institu-
tional survivor of two decades' experimentation with comprehensive
approaches to sentencing reform. During the 1970s, four differing re-
form approaches contended (Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 3). Parole
guidelines, the earliest dating initially from the late 1960s, were an
effort to reduce disparities in prison sentences by structuring the dis-
cretion of parole boards in setting release dates. A number of states,
notably including Oregon, Washington, and Minnesota, and the fed-
eral system, adopted parole guidelines (e.g., Gottfredson, Wilkins, and
Hoffman 1978; Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1981; Bottomley 1990). Because
parole boards, however, have no jurisdiction over jail sentences or
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nonincarcerative penalties, or over the decision whether to incarcerate
in state prisons, parole guidelines were at best a partial solution to
sentencing disparities and were repealed to be replaced by sentencing
guidelines in the jurisdictions mentioned. Some states continue to de-
velop and to use parole guidelines, but they are promoted as relevant
to parole administration and not as a stand-alone sentencing reform.
Next in order, expressly building on experience with parole guide-
lines and dating initially from pilot projects in Denver and Vermont
in the mid-1970s, were sentencing guidelines that were "voluntary" in
the two senses that they were developed by judges without a statutory
mandate and that judicial compliance with them was entirely discre-
tionary with the individual judge (Wilkins et al. 1978; Kress 1980). By
the early 1980s, voluntary guidelines had been developed in most states
(Blumstein et al. 1983, pp. 138-39), sometimes at the state level (e.g.,
Maryland, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wis-
consin) and more often at county or judicial district levels (Shane-
DuBow, Brown, and Olsen 1985). The voluntary guidelines were often
created by judges in hopes that by putting their own houses in order
they would forestall passage of mandatory or determinate sentencing
laws (e.g., Carrow et al. 1985, pp. 126-27). Evaluations showed that
voluntary guidelines typically had little or no demonstrable effect on
sentences imposed (Rich et al. 1982; Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 4;
Carrow 1984; Carrow et al. 1985), and in most places they were aban-
doned. They continue in effect in a number of states, including Michi-
gan and Wisconsin, but no evaluations have been published. The nota-
ble exception to the generally pessimistic story of voluntary guidelines
is in Delaware, where they took effect in the mid-1980s and appear to
have normative and collegial, albeit they do not have formal legal,
authority (e.g., Quinn 1990, 1992; Gebelein 1991). In Delaware, also,
no major independent or other evaluations have been published.
Third in sequence were statutory determinate sentencing schemes
dating from the mid-to-late 1970s like those in California, Illinois, Indi-
ana, and North Carolina. They were diversely specific, ranging from
California where, initially, for example, robbery was specified to war-
rant a three-year prison term in the ordinary case, but two or four
years if mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present, to Indi-
ana where statutes prescribed ranges of ten to forty years for some
offenses (Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 3). Few of the statutory schemes
were subjected to independent evaluations by outsiders. The excep-
tions are California, where many evaluations were conducted (for a
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complete list, see Cohen and Tonry 1983, table 7-15), and North Caro-
lina, where Stevens Clarke and colleagues completed a number of eval-
uations (Clarke et al. 1983; Clarke 1984, 1987). In both states, statutory
determinate sentencing laws reduced sentencing disparities and (re-
markably, in retrospect) led to reductions in average sentence lengths.
Nonetheless, no state known to me (and I have said this often in places
where, if I am wrong, I should have been corrected) has adopted a
statutory determinate sentencing system for more than ten years.
After nearly two decades of experimentation, the guideline-setting
sentencing commission is the only reform strategy that commands
widespread support and continues to be the subject of new legislation.
Legislation to establish the first two commissions, in Minnesota and
Pennsylvania, was enacted in 1978. In other places I have told the
story of sentencing commissions through the mid-1980s (Tonry 1987,
1988). Suffice to say that by 1987, presumptive guidelines created by
sentencing commissions were in place in Minnesota, Washington, and
(after an initial legislative rejection) Pennsylvania. Voluntary guide-
lines in Maryland and Florida, which had been created with federal
demonstration project money, were adopted statewide; Florida's were
converted into (nominally) presumptive guidelines, and the judicial
steering committee that oversaw the demonstration project evolved into
a sentencing commission (Carrow et al. 1985). Entities called sentenc-
ing commissions had been created in South Carolina (von Hirsch,
Knapp, and Tonry 1987, pp. 24-25, 117-24), New York (Griset
1991), Connecticut (Shane-DuBow, Brown, and Olsen 1985), and
Maine (von Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry 1987, pp. 20-21), but either
decided not to develop guidelines (Maine and Connecticut) or tried to
do so but were unable to persuade state legislatures to ratify the guide-
lines proposed (New York and South Carolina).
The pace of sentencing commission activity increased after the mid-
1980s. The federal legislation was passed in 1984, commissioners were
appointed in 1985, and the guidelines took effect in 1987. Oregon's
guidelines took effect in 1989; with Washington and Minnesota, Ore-
gon has the most sophisticated guidelines now in use. Guidelines cre-
ated by sentencing commissions took effect in Tennessee, Louisiana
and, after legislative rejection of initial proposed guidelines, in Kansas
in 1993 (Gottlieb 1991). At the time of writing, sentencing commis-
sions are at work in Ohio, North Carolina, and Alaska, and commis-
sions with wider charges to consider sentencing and corrections policies
and laws are working in Texas and Arkansas (Knapp 1993).
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Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once observed that "it is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single, courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country" (New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 [1932]). Amid discussion,
development, promulgation, enactment, rejection, celebration, and de-
nunciation of American's experiments with sentencing commissions, it
seems a good time to take stock of what has happened to Judge Fran-
kel's suggestion that sentencing policy be made the subject of adminis-
trative rule making.
Numerous entities of different sorts have been called sentencing
commissions but my focus here is principally on those that fall within
Judge Frankel's proposals for statutory creation of an administrative
body charged with developing rules for sentencing that would be pre-
sumptively applicable, subject to a judge's authority to impose some
other sentence if reasons were given, with that judgment being subject
to review on appeal by a higher court (von Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry
1987, chap. 1). At least ten commissions fit that definition (more or less
in chronological order, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Maine, Washington,
South Carolina, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Oregon, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Kansas, and Ohio). Excluded are commissions
with more general charges to consider sentencing or corrections issues,
or both, and formulate recommendations. The most celebrated com-
mission of this type was the Canadian Sentencing Commission (1987);
notable American instances occurred in New York (Griset 1991),
Texas (Reynolds 1993), and Arkansas (Knapp 1993).
This essay consists of three sections. The first examines experience
with sentencing commissions in relation to the effects of their guide-
lines on sentencing patterns and correctional practices and in relation to
their institutional properties (specialized competence, insulation from
short-term emotionalism and political pressures, a systemic approach
to policy-making). The second section canvasses the major policy issues
that current commissions have addressed and that future commissions
must resolve. The third provides a diagnosis of the state of health of
Judge Frankel's proposal and its long-term prospects.
Before beginning, one final prefatory note concerning sources is nec-
essary. The scholarly and evaluation literatures on sentencing commis-
sions and their guidelines are slight. Besides Judge Frankel's book,
only three others have discussed commissions (as opposed to their
guidelines) in any detail (O'Donnell, Churgin, and Curtis 1977; von
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Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry 1987; Parent 1988) and only a handful of
articles (Tonry 1979, 1991; Frankel and Orland 1984; Wright 1991).
Private foundations and the federal research-sponsoring agencies have
shown little interest in sentencing for many years and, as a result, little
has been added to the literature since the last time I took stock of
the sentencing commission experience (Tonry 1988). The only major
exception concerns the U.S. Sentencing Commission on which a mod-
est evaluation literature (e.g., Schulhofer and Nagel 1989; Heaney
1991; Karle and Sager 1991; U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991a,
1991b; Dunworth and Weisselberg 1992; Meierhoefer 1992; Nagel and
Schulhofer 1992; U.S. General Accounting Office 1992) and'a sizable
policy literature (e.g., Wright 1991; Freed 1992; Doob 1993; Tonry
1993b) have accumulated. The bimonthly Federal Sentencing Reporter
published by the University of California Press for the Vera Institute
of Justice is a treasure trove of otherwise fugitive reports and analyses
of the federal sentencing commission and its guidelines; the December
1992 issue is devoted entirely to evaluation issues. In addition, most
sentencing commissions collect monitoring data in greater or lesser
detail and publish annual or more frequent statistical reports. There
are a handful of recent empirical writings by others, using commission
data, in Minnesota (e.g., Frase 1991, 1993a) and Washington (Boerner
1993), and a small number of articles have described the policies and
processes of state sentencing commissions (Kramer and Scirica 1985;
Parent 1988; Bogan 1990, 1991; Griset 1991; Lieb 1991, 1993; Dailey
1992; Kramer 1992; Gottlieb 1993; Wright and Ellis 1993) and the
federal sentencing commission (Breyer 1988, 1992; von Hirsch 1988;
Stith and Koh 1993; Tonry 1991, 1993b). Finally, five law reviews
have recently devoted symposium issues to sentencing.2 This essay
draws on these sources and also on personal contacts with state and
federal policymakers and practitioners.
I. Experience with Commissions
The crux of judge Frankel's proposal concerned the institutional capac-
ities of administrative agencies. Rule-making authority has been dele-
gated by legislatures in the United States to countless state and federal
agencies on the bases that, better than any legislature, they can achieve
2 The Yale Law Journal (vol. 101, no. 8), the University of Southern California Law Review
(vol. 66, no. 1), the University of California Davis Law Review (vol. 25, no. 3), the Wake
Forest Law Review (vol. 28, no. 2), and the University of Colorado Law Review (vol. 64,
no. 3).
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and maintain specialized competence concerning complex subjects,
they have some degree of insulation from short-term popular emotions
and political pressures, and they can adopt comprehensive, long-term
approaches to policy-making. Because the sentencing commission was
proposed as a tool for establishing standards for sentencing and reduc-
ing disparities, any stocktaking must consider two questions. First,
have commissions successfully developed and implemented sentencing
guidelines that have changed sentencing practices and reduced dispari-
ties? Second, as administrative agencies, have sentencing commissions
developed specialized competence, achieved some insulation from
knee-jerk politics, and adopted comprehensive, long-term approaches
to policymaking?
A. Effects on Sentencing Practices
Guidelines developed by commissions have changed sentencing
practices and patterns, reduced disparities, ameliorated racial and gen-
der differences, and helped states control their prison populations.
That statement camouflages deep disagreements about the wisdom of
decisions made by commissions. In the federal system, for example,
numerous observers charge that the new sentencing patterns are too
severe and that the new practices are undesirable because lawyers and
judges commonly, and foreseeably, manipulate the guidelines to avoid
imposing sentences that they believe are too harsh (Federal Courts
Study Committee 1990; Freed 1992; Nagel and Schulhofer 1992;
Tonry 1993b). In the federal, Minnesota, and Oregon systems, critics
argue that disparities have been reduced by violating the second half
of the equality injunction ("and treat different cases differently"). Ra-
cial and gender differences have been reduced but, controlling for cur-
rent offenses and criminal histories, women and whites continue more
often to receive mitigated sentences than do men and blacks and, con-
versely, men and blacks more often receive aggravated sentences. Gen-
der differences have been ameliorated but only by increasing the rela-
tive severity of women's punishments compared with preguidelines
patterns in which women's sentences were markedly less severe than
men's (e.g., Knapp 1984, pp. 67-68). Racial differences have dimin-
ished in some jurisdictions, but only by limiting standard sentencing
criteria to current offense and criminal history information (which in
any case has a systematically unfavorable disparate impact on black
defendants) and by forbidding judges to adjust sentences on the basis of
biographical information such as education, employment, and family
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status, 3 which lessens chances of favorable treatment of nondisadvan-
taged defendants but in many individual cases penalizes disadvantaged
defendants who have to some degree overcome dismal life chances.
Finally, although some jurisdictions have managed to regulate their
prison populations, some never tried and the U.S. commission, despite
a statutory directive, failed to do so.
Nonetheless,-while reasonable people can disagree about the wisdom
of policies commissions have adopted and regret that they have not
been more successful at reducing unwarranted disparities and eliminat-
ing harsher treatment of minority defendants, no informed person can
disagree that some commissions and their guidelines have altered sen-
tencing practices and patterns in their jurisdictions.
1. Conformity with Guidelines. Data are available from four states
and the federal system on judges' compliance with guidelines. It is
clear that judges in a large majority of cases will conform the sentences
they announce to applicable authorized sentencing ranges. That asser-
tion requires two important caveats. First, guideline developers have
often insisted that guidelines should be disregarded when a case's spe-
cial features warrant different treatment (Gottfredson, Wilkins, and
Hoffman 1978); they are after all guidelines, not mandatory penalties, 4
and judges' reasons for imposing some other sentence can be stated for
the record and examined by higher courts. From this perspective, a
guidelines system that elicited 100 percent compliance would be unde-
sirable because judges would not be discriminating among cases as
they should.
Second, if judges are willing to give plea bargaining free rein, com-
pliance may be more apparent than real. Guidelines make sentencing
predictable. Picture a guidelines grid as a dart board. Figure 1 as an
example shows the initial 1989 Oregon grid. Each cell specifies a range
of presumptively appropriate sentences; to fix the game counsel need
only be sure that their dart hits the right cell. This they can do by
means of charge dismissals. If counsel negotiate a fifteen-month prison
sentence, and the applicable sentencing range for offense X is fourteen
to sixteen months, the defendant need only plead guilty to X and the
The federal guidelines, for example, in § 5H 1.6 provide: "Family ties and responsi-
bilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should-be
outside the guidelines" (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1992a). Comparable rules apply
to education and employment.
' Although the U.S. Sentencing Commission has muddied the distinction by describ-
ing its own presumptive guidelines as "mandatory guidelines" (U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission 1991a, p. i).
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(1991).
prosecutor to dismiss any other charges to assure the agreed sentence.
Of course, different prosecutors may offer different deals to like-
situated offenders, who may therefore plead guilty to offense Y or
offense Z. So long as the judge imposes the agreed sentence from
within the applicable guideline range in every case, nominal compli-
ance will be absolute, however disparate the sentences like-situated
offenders receive.
There is considerable evidence that counsel do bargain around guide-
lines, which makes before-and-after-guidelines comparisons of sentenc-
ing difficult; the meaning of a plea to, say, second-degree aggravated
assault may be different before and under guidelines. Comparisons of
Sentencing Commissions
TABLE I
Conviction Offenses by Seriousness Levels, 1982 and 1985 (%)
Level FY 1982 January-June 1985 Difference
XIV .2 .1 -. 1
XIII .5 .3 -. 2
XII .3 .2 -. 1
XI .1 .2 +A
X .9 .4 -. 5
IX 5.6 3.6 -2.0
VIII 1.4 .6 -. 8
VII 3.4 2.0 -1.4
VI 4.7 5.7 + 1.0
V .8 .7 -. 1
IV 10.6 9.7 -. 9
III 8.3 10.1 +1.8
11 34.5 33.3 - 1.2
28.7 31.1 +2.4
Unranked .0 1.9 + 1.9
Total 100.0 99.9
SouRcE.-Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission (1985), p. 3.
NOTE.-Level XIV is the most serious category (aggravated murder). Percentages do
not equal 100 due to rounding. FY = fiscal year.
plea bargaining in Minnesota before and under guidelines showed a
marked shift away from sentence bargaining and toward charge bar-
gaining (Knapp 1984, chap. 6). Frase, in a quantitative analysis of
Minnesota sentencing patterns through 1989, concluded, "It appears
likely that whatever plea-trial disparities there were before the guide-
lines went into effect continued to exist in the early post-guidelines
years, and still exist today; plea bargaining, and its accompanying
charge and sentence disparities, is 'alive and well' in Minnesota"
(1993a, p. 34).
In Washington State, as table 1 shows, there was a marked shift in
offense-of-conviction patterns after the guidelines took effect. In gen-
eral, convictions of offenses subject to presumptive state-prison sen-
tences declined, and convictions of other offenses increased. Similarly,
among the six lowest offense levels, in which the presumption gener-
ally is against state incarceration, there was a marked shift toward
more convictions for the least serious crimes, for which the guidelines
did not call for any incarceration.
In Pennsylvania, a more subtle pattern appeared which shows how
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guidelines can accommodate different patterns of plea bargaining. Ta-
ble 2 shows patterns of guideline compliance in Pennsylvania in 1983
and 1986. 5 Pennsylvania has a unique set of guidelines that establish
standard, aggravated, and mitigated ranges for every offense and, like
most jurisdictions,' recognize various severity levels of some crimes
(e.g., first-, second-, and third-degree robbery). Two patterns stand
out from table 2. For most sets of offenses, fewer than half of those
convicted of the most serious grade of the offense received sentences
within the standard range; mitigated-range sentences were high, and
downward departures were very high. Among those convicted of the
lowest-grade offense in each set, from 62 to 96 percent received stan-
dard-range sentences; mitigated-range and downward-departure sen-
tences were much less common. The most plausible explanation is that
these patterns reveal the operation of diverse plea negotiation conven-
tions within Pennsylvania. Where sentence bargaining is common, de-
fendants plead guilty to the most serious offense charged with an un-
derstanding that the judge will impose a mitigated sentence or depart
downward. Where charge bargaining is common, defendants plead to
a charge which bears a presumptive penalty they will accept, and
judges then impose a standard-range sentence.
In theory, plea bargains should not distort application of the federal
guidelines because they are based on the defendant's "relevant con-
duct" as determined by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing
and not merely on the conviction offense. Nonetheless, there is sub-
stantial evidence from research sponsored by the U.S. commission
(Schulhofer and Nagel 1989; U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991b,
chap. 6; Nagel and Schulhofer 1992) and research by others (Heaney
1991) that counsel, often with tacit judicial approval, do bargain around
the guidelines. Sometimes this is done by having the defendant plead
guilty to an offense for which the maximum lawful sentence is less
than the applicable guideline range. Sometimes it is done by counsel
stipulating to facts that omit details like weapon use or victim injury
or a larger quantity of drugs that require a stiffer sentence. Sometimes
it is done by understandings that the judge will ignore the guidelines
and that neither party will appeal. Sometimes it is done in even more
' Comparable patterns continued in 1991 although reclassification of some offenses
makes exact comparisons impossible (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 1993,
table 4).
6 The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission (1993) has pro-
posed that North Carolina adopt guidelines patterned on Pennsylvania's separate set of
ranges for standard, mitigated, and aggravated sentences (see also Lubitz 1993).
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Byzantine ways. 7 Although no one has devised a credible estimate of
how often the guidelines are deceptively evaded, commission-
sponsored research acknowledges that bargaining distorts guideline ap-
plication in at least 25 to 35 percent of cases (Nagel and Schulhofer
1992).
Keeping in mind therefore that compliance rates may mean less than
appears, table 3 shows compliance and departure rates for selected
recent years for Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and
the federal system. Departure rates are low in every jurisdiction, which
shows that guidelines have moral force in each of them. Judges sworn
to enforce the law are presumably more comfortable not "departing"
from guidelines that the legislature has adopted or ratified. Not much
else can be concluded from table 3. Because guideline ranges vary
substantially from Minnesota's very narrow ones (e.g., for rape with
no prior record: eighty-one to ninety-one months) to Pennsylvania's
very broad combination of standard, aggravated, and mitigated ranges
(e.g., for rape with no prior record: twenty-seven to seventy-five
months), comparisons of departure rates across jurisdictions offer no
comparative insights into sentencing consistency. Moreover, jurisdic-
tions count departures in different ways. In the federal system, sen-
tence reductions awarded defendants for "substantial assistance to the
government" are not considered departures. Nor in Pennsylvania are
sentences in the aggravated and mitigated ranges considered depar-
tures. Nor in Washington are sentence reductions under "First-Time
Offender Waiver" and "Sex Offender Sentencing Option" provisions.
Once all the caveats are taken into account, and ignoring plea-
bargaining complications, it would appear that the greatest levels of
guidelines compliance occur in Oregon and Minnesota. Here too, un-
fortunately, things are not as simple as appears. As Frase has pointed
out (1991; 1993a, p. 17 and figs. 4-6), gross compliance rates are mis-
leading; a better inquiry would focus on departures from what to what.
He shows, for example, that in Minnesota rates of mitigated disposi-
tional departures (that is non-state-prison sentences when the guide-
lines specify state prison) annually represented 3-7 percent of all felony
sentences between 1981 and 1989, but represented from 19 to 33 per-
7 Rule 5.k. ., e.g., allows the judge to disregard the guidelines altogether if the
prosecutor files a motion requesting a mitigated sentence because of the defendant's
"substantial assistance to the government"; if the prosecutor's real motive is to avoid an
unduly harsh sentence, observers can not know whether the claimed "substantial assis-
tance" was provided or was useful.
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cent of all presumptive prison sentences. This is because guidelines
presume state imprisonment for only approximately 20 percent of con-
victed felons. If, therefore 7 percent of all cases are mitigated disposi-
tional departures, they represent a third of those presumed bound for
prison.
One last permutation on compliance-and-departure calculations is to
disaggregate for types of offense. Pennsylvania's guidelines, for exam-
ple, cover felonies and misdemeanors. Although 87 percent of Pennsyl-
vania sentences in 1983 fell within the applicable guideline ranges,
when the data are broken down, 97 percent of misdemeanor sentences
were compliant but only 79 percent of felony sentences (Tonry 1988,
table 8). Significantly lower compliance rates characterized escape (40
percent), arson (64 percent), involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (68
percent), and aggravated assault (70 percent) (Tonry 1988, table 9).
Data for 1991 show an 85 percent overall compliance rate which breaks
down much as the 1983 data did (Pennsylvania Commission on Sen-
tencing 1993, table 9).
For all the qualifications, however, judges much more often than
not impose sentences that comply with applicable guidelines.
2. Disparity Reduction. Every sentencing commission claims that its
guidelines have reduced sentencing disparities compared with sentenc-
ing patterns before guidelines took effect. Research on disparities, how-
ever, faces a number of formidable problems, some of which mirror
the problems posed by data on compliance with guidelines. First, pro-
mulgation of guidelines may affect plea bargaining and before-and-after
comparisons may be confounded if charging and bargaining practices
change with the guidelines. If offenses labeled as second-degree aggra-
vated assaults are systematically different before and under guidelines,
analyses of disparities in sentencing for that offense may involve
apples-and-oranges comparisons. If, for example, less serious second-
degree assaults under guidelines more often result in pleas to less seri-
ous charges than before, cases resulting in convictions of second-degree
assault may be more homogeneously serious and apparently reduced
disparity a product of that greater homogeneity. Second, as was true
during most of the last decade, if public and officials' attitudes toward
offenders became more punitive over time, sentences are likely to have
become harsher with or without guidelines and that rising tide compli-
cates disparity analyses. Third, and most important, is a combined
conceptual and methodological problem. Most disparity-reduction
analyses use the offense severity and criminal history classifications
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that are expressed in the relevant guidelines as the basis of compari-
sons, rather than comprehensive statistical models of sentencing before
and under guidelines, and this inevitably exaggerates the extent to
which disparities have been reduced. This last problem has greatest
relevance to the federal guidelines; recent evaluations of the federal
sentencing guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (199 l b) and
the U.S. General Accounting Office (1992) illustrate the problem, and
it is discussed in some detail below.
Because the evidence is clearer in the states and because the federal
guidelines present special problems for disparity analyses, I discuss
them in separate subsections. First, however, some prefatory remarks
about disparity studies are in order. Most of the analyses discussed are
efforts to compare sentencing disparities in the first year, or few years,
under a guidelines system with sentencing in some period before guide-
lines took effect. As time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult,
and soon impossible, to reach conclusions about disparities. After a
few years, hypothetical comparisons must be made with sentencing
patterns as they would have been had guidelines not been adopted.
This is impossible to do. The public and political attitudes and sensibil-
ities that led to creation of a sentencing commission would presumably
have influenced sentencing patterns without guidelines. In addition,
political and policy environments change over time, and these changes
would also alter sentencing patterns with or without guidelines.
a. Disparity Reduction in the States. There are plausible grounds for
believing that the state guidelines in their early years reduced dispari-
ties. In Minnesota, where more evaluations have been conducted than
in any other state, an evaluation of the first four years experience
concluded, "disparity in sentencing decreased under the sentencing
guidelines. This reduction in disparity is indicated by increased sen-
tence uniformity and proportionality" (Knapp 1984, pp. v-vi). Outside
evaluators agreed: Minnesota "was largely successful in reducing pre-
guideline disparities in those decisions that fall within the scope of the
guidelines" (Miethe and Moore 1985, p. 360). Frase, drawing on data
for 1981 to 1989, concludes that "the Minnesota guidelines have
achieved, and continue to achieve" most of their goals, including dis-
parity reduction, and "have been modestly successful in achieving
greater honesty and uniformity in sentencing" (Frase 1993a, p. 3).
No independent evaluations have been published concerning the
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Delaware guidelines, but
each commission, relying on its regularly collected monitoring data,
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has concluded that disparities declined. The Washington commission,
relying on 1985 data, concluded, "the Sentencing Reform Act has
clearly increased consistency in the imprisonment decision" (Washing-
ton State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1986, p. 7). Looking back
over the first six years' experience with guidelines, the Washington
commission reported, "the high degree of compliance with sentencing
guidelines has reduced variability in sentencing among counties and
among judges" (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1992b, p. 12). On the early years of the Pennsylvania guidelines, its
commission concluded for 1983, "it appears that Pennsylvania's guide-
lines are accomplishing their intended goal of reducing unwarranted
sentencing disparity" (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 1984,
p. i), and for 1984, "sentences became more uniform throughout the
state" (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 1985, p. i). Kramer
and Lubitz (1985) agreed. Finally, reporting on the first fifteen months'
guidelines experience in Oregon, its commission concluded, "the
guidelines have increased uniformity in sentencing considerably. Dis-
positional variability for offenders with identical crime seriousness and
criminal history scores has been reduced by 45 percent over the vari-
ability under the pre-guidelines system" (Ashford and Mosbaek 1991,
p. viii).
In Delaware, no evaluation has been published of the effects of its
voluntary guidelines on disparities. However, a number of publications
by the chairman (Gebelein 1991) and director (Quinn 1990, 1992) of
Delaware's Sentencing Accountability Commission list "consistency
and certainty" among the guidelines' goals and present data showing
that the guidelines have succeeded in increasing use of incarceration for
violent offenders and use of intermediate punishments for nonviolent
offenders. This at least arguably supports an inference of greater con-
sistency in Delaware sentencing.
Most likely, sentencing guidelines reduced disparities in all these
jurisdictions compared with what they would have been without guide-
lines. Judge Frankel's complaints about lawlessness in sentencing pre-
sumably strike a responsive chord in most judges and lawyers. Because
presumptive guidelines set authoritative standards for sentences where
none existed, it would be astonishing if they had no effect on sentenc-
ing decisions. Even when plea bargaining, which is nearly ubiquitous
in American courts, is taken into account, it is likely that the bargaining
takes place in the shadow of the guidelines and that the bargained
sentences are more consistent than otherwise they would have been.
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Nonetheless, the evaluation research evidence on this question is less
definitive than it appears or than its celebrants claim.
b. Disparity-Reduction in the Federal System. The evidence on federal
sentencing disparities is mixed, and the best conclusion at present is
that we do not know whether disparities have increased or decreased
(Rhodes 1992; Weisburd 1992; Tonry 1993b). Although the U.S. com-
mission, on the basis of an evaluation of the first four years experience
with federal guidelines, claims "the data . . . show significant reduc-
tions in disparity" (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991b, p. 419), there
is reason to doubt that conclusion. Because both the U.S. commission
and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) devoted extensive
efforts to measuring changes in sentencing disparities, I discuss the
subject at some length.
For a discussion of the federal evaluation to be intelligible to readers
not already familiar with the federal guidelines, some description of
the system is necessary. Judges in setting sentences are supposed first
to consult a schedule for the particular offense (table 4 shows the sched-
ule for robbery) which specifies a "base offense level." Then, on the
basis of various offense circumstances, such as whether the offender
was armed and if so with what, whether the weapon was used and
with what injurious result, and the value of any property taken, the
offense level is adjusted upward or downward (almost always upward).
Next the judge must determine the offender's criminal history score
(mostly a measure of prior convictions). Finally the judge is to consult
a two-dimensional grid (see table 5) to learn the presumptive sentence
for the offender, given his adjusted offense level and his criminal his-
tory. Thus, a hypothetical offender who was convicted of robbery
(base offense level in table 5: 20) of $15,000 (increase by one level) of
a bank (increase by two levels), in which he possessed and discharged
a firearm (increase by seven levels), causing a minor injury (increase
by two levels), would, with no prior record, fall within level thirty-two
and be presumed to receive a prison sentence between 121 and 151
months.
The federal guidelines, uniquely among American guideline sys-
tems, are based not on the offense to which the defendant pled guilty
or of which he was convicted at trial, but on "actual offense behavior,"
which the commission calls "relevant conduct." The chairman and
general counsel of the commission have explained that the relevant
conduct approach was intended to offset efforts by prosecutors to ma-
nipulate the guidelines by dismissing charges to achieve a conviction
TABLE 4
Robbery, Extortion, and Blackmail
§2B3.1 Robbery
a) Base offense level: 20
b) Specific offense characteristics
1. If the property of a financial institution or post office was taken, or if the taking
of such property was an object of the offense, increase by 2 levels.
2. (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was other-
wise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or pos-
sessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, in-
crease by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or
possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if an express threat of death was made, in-
crease by 2 levels.
3. If any victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the
seriousness of the injury:
Degree of bodily injury and increase in level
A) Bodily injury, add 2 levels
B) Serious bodily injury, add 4 levels
Q Permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, add 6 levels
D) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions A and B,
add 3 levels; or
E) If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions B and C,
add 5 levels.
Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments from (2) and (3) shall not
exceed 11 levels.
4. (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to fa-
cilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person was physically re-
strained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase
by 2 levels.
5. If a firearm, destructive device, or controlled substance was taken, or if the tak-
ing of such item was an object of the offense, increase by 1 level.
6. If the loss exceeded $10,000, increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
A) $10,000 or less no increase
B) More than $10,000 add 1
C) More than $50,000 add 2
D) More than $250,000 add 3
E) More than $800,000 add 4
,F) More than $1,500,000 add 5
G) More than $2,500,000 add 6
H) More than $5,000,000 add 7
SOURCE.-U.S. Sentencing Commission (1992a).
Sentencing Commissions
offense that, under the guidelines, prescribed the preferred sentence
(Wilkins and Steer 1990).
The complexity of the federal guidelines and their reliance on rele-
vant conduct present nearly insuperable difficulties for a before-and-
after disparity analysis. Information concerning drug quantity or pu-
rity or the presence of an unused firearm or the occurrence of
uncharged crimes, all of which are "relevant conduct" and have incre-
mental punitive significance, was often not material before the guide-
lines took effect. Consequently, there was no reason for probation
officers to obtain or record such information, and for periods before
November 1987 it is not systematically and reliably available. The
GAO observed, "significant differences in much of the offender data
available made it difficult to reliably match and compare groups of
preguidelines and guidelines offenders. Preguideline offender data fo-
cused on personal information, such as socioeconomic status and family
and community ties, that was supposed to be irrelevant under the
guidelines in all or most cases. Conversely, most of the detailed data
available on guidelines offenders, such as role in the offense, were not
available for preguidelines cases" (1992, p. 10).
The commission and GAO approached disparities in two ways-by
asking participants whether they believed disparities had been reduced
and by conducting sophisticated quantitative analyses. All that can be
learned from the interviews and surveys is that prosecutors and proba-
tion officers were likelier to believe that disparities had been reduced
than were judges and defense lawyers. Table 6 shows answers to ques-
tions about reduced disparities from GAO interviews in four sites,
commission interviews in twelve sites, and a commission mail survey.
Table 6 shows that most judges and defense counsel did not believe
disparities to have been reduced (significant and slight majorities of
prosecutors and probation officers disagreed). An earlier analysis of
the guidelines by the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990) reported
that many judges and the committee itself believed that disparities had
increased.
The quantitative analyses were also inconclusive. The GAO's con-
clusion, based both on examination of the U.S. commission's statistical
analyses and reanalysis of the commission's data is that "limitations
and inconsistencies in the data available for preguidelines and guideline
offenders made it impossible to determine how effective the sentencing
guidelines have been in reducing overall sentencing disparity" (1992,
p. 10).
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TABLE 6
Percentage of Practitioners Who Believe Unwarranted Disparities
Have Been Reduced
Federal Private Probation
Judges Prosecutors Defenders Attorneys Officers
USSC interviews 50 76 41 32 59
USSC mail survey 32 51 11 19 52
GAO interviews 20 83 ( 37 ) 50
SouRcEs.-For USSC interviews, U.S. Sentencing Commission (1991b), table 27;
for USSC mail survey, U.S. Sentencing Commission (1991b), table 28; for GAO inter-
views, U.S. General Accounting Office (1992), table 3.
NoTE.-USSC = U.S. Sentencing Commission; GAO = U.S. General Accounting
Office.
The commission would put a different gloss on its and GAO's find-
ings on disparity reduction. The GAO entitled its report "Sentencing
Guidelines-Central Questions Remain Unanswered." Commission
Chairman Wilkins urged instead, "Sentencing Guidelines: Disparity
Reduced, but Some Questions Remain" (GAO 1992, p. 182).
The insurmountable problem that comparable pre- and postguide-
lines data are not available served as the basis for GAO's agnosticism,
though it noted that commission analyses showed reduction in dispari-
ties for some selected offenses. The GAO's own analysis showed that
"unwarranted disparity continued" in relation to offenders' race, gen-
der, employment status, age, and marital status (1992, p. 12).
Because of data limitations, the commission confined its empirical
analyses of disparity reduction to four categories of robbery (with no
or moderate criminal history, with and without a weapon), two catego-
ries of embezzlement ($10,000-$20,000 loss, $20,000-$40,000 loss),
heroin trafficking (100-400 grams), and cocaine trafficking (500-2000
grams). Sample sizes were tiny (preguidelines samples were 17, 13,
25, 18, 27, 36, 40, and 44 cases; postguidelines samples were 80, 38,
57, 24, 56, 71, 72, and 81 cases). Sentences from downward departures
for "substantial assistance to the government" were excluded from the
analysis. For each of the eight offenses examined, sentences "pre" and
"post" guidelines (both sentences announced and sentences "expected
to be served") were characterized in terms of means, medians, and the
range in months within which the middle 80 percent of cases fell. The
breadth of the ranges of the middle 80 percent of sentences declined
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for all eight offenses, though for five of those offenses the decline was
not statistically significant. As commentators have stressed, the "not
statistically significant" caveat means that the apparent reduction in
disparity in five of the eight offenses studied may result from random
chance and have nothing to do with the guidelines (Rhodes 1992;
Weisburd 1992).
There are, unhappily, five reasons why even these modest findings
are suspect. The first two are the inherent data limitations mentioned
earlier and the tiny sample sizes. The third is that the commission's
own process evaluation and several other studies (Schulhofer and Nagel
1989; Nagel and Schulhofer 1992) suggest that "substantial assistance"
notions are commonly used to permit judges to impose sentences less
severe than guideline sentences that the judge and the prosecutor con-
sider too severe. In fiscal year 1991, of all disposed cases, 11.9 percent
were downward departures for substantial assistance; 21 percent of
drug offense dispositions were substantial assistance departures (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1992b, table 55). Since judges are completely
free of the guidelines once a substantial assistance motion is filed, op-
portunity for disparity is great. Excluding those departures from the
disparity analysis inevitably understates the degree of variation in sen-
tences, especially for drug cases.
The fourth problem is that two of the offenses examined, heroin and
cocaine trafficking, became subject to mandatory minimum five-year
sentences after the cases in the preguidelines sample were decided.
Thus any apparent reduction in disparity for those offenses is likelier
to result from passage of the mandatory minimum legislation than from
implementation of the guidelines.
The fifth, and most important problem, however, is conceptual.
"Unwarranted disparity" is not defined in the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, and the commission selected a self-serving definition that inev-
itably exaggerated disparity reduction. Much research on sentencing
disparities uses multivariate analyses and mathematical models to de-
scribe sentencing patterns before and after a policy or law change (e.g.,
Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 2). Observed changes, assuming they are
statistically significant and theoretically plausible, are then attributed
to the change. The commission, instead, defined unwarranted dispari-
ties solely in terms of its own guidelines offense and criminal history
characteristics.
The commission's approach is misleading for two reasons. First,
because federal law and guidelines now set very precise standards for
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sentences in relation to offenses and criminal history, and the previous
law had only maximum authorized sanctions and a few mandatory
minimums, it would be astonishing if the new guidelines had no effect
on sentencing patterns. Previously there were no targets to shoot at
but under guidelines there were. Unless judges completely ignored the
guidelines, sentences should on average have become closer to the tar-
gets. Second, however, the commission's approach might completely
miss increases in disparity in relation to variables other than current
offense and criminal history characteristics.
Doob (1993), for example, hypothesizes a situation in which pre-
guideline sentencing decisions were premised solely on rehabilitative
considerations and, in light of the relevant criteria, perfectly consistent.
By using its culpability-based offense and criminal history categories
to measure disparities, and superimposing them on the preguidelines
data, the commission's methodology would miss the prior perfect con-
sistency (by reference to different criteria) and most likely and unsur-
prisingly conclude that sentences were less disparate by its criteria
after guidelines than before.
Suppose, for another example, that before the guidelines took effect,
employed offenders with dependent children typically received lighter
sentences because of judges' concern for the effects of a prison sentence
on spouses, children, and household stability (as Wheeler, Mann, and
Sarat [1991] suggest). The federal guidelines, which forbid judges to
take account of employment prospects or family status, may have made
the effects of employment plus dependents less consistent than before
the guidelines; some judges foreseeably will circumvent the guidelines
to achieve sentences that appear to them just and that follow the previ-
ous conventions, while others will adhere to the guidelines. Thus, in
relation to employment and family status, sentencing under the guide-
lines will be more, not less, disparate than under the old system. By
defining and looking for "unwarranted disparities" as it did, the com-
mission undertook an impoverished look at disparity that was likely to
produce a finding that disparities declined.
These methodological, measurement, and conceptual problems in-
creased the odds that the commission would find that unwarranted
disparities have declined. That statistically significant findings of re-
duced disparities were achieved for only three of eight selected crimes
suggests that disparities have not declined very much or at all, or, as
GAO more cautiously concluded, that decline cannot be demon-
strated.
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Absence of evidence is not, of course, evidence of absence. My best
guess is that the state commissions are right and that sentencing in
their states became more consistent and that disparities declined. It is
harder to be sure about the federal guidelines because their complexity,
rigidity, and severity have fostered such wholesale circumvention that
much case disposition has been forced below ground, and it is unclear
how reliable federal data are on the characteristics of disposed cases.
3. Sentencing Patterns. Most commissions have adopted "prescrip-
tive" guidelines that are intended to change existing sentencing patterns
(rather than "descriptive" guidelines intended to reproduce, with
greater consistency, past sentencing practices). Minnesota and Wash-
ington sought to increase use of imprisonment for violent offenses and
to decrease it for property offenses and assert that their monitoring
data show that those objectives were achieved in the guidelines' early
years (Knapp [1984], p. 31; Washington State Sentencing Guidelines
Commission [1986], fig. 1; these analyses are discussed in some detail
in Tonry [1988], pp. 306-9). Oregon had the same goals and found
that the proportion of offenders convicted of felonies against persons
who received state prison sentences increased from 34 percent before
guidelines to 48 percent under guidelines while the proportion of prop-
erty felons sentenced to state prisons declined from 19 to 9 percent;
imprisonment for sex abuse felonies tripled from 13 to 42 percent
(Ashford and Mosbaek 1991, pp. viii, 11). Pennsylvania sought to in-
crease sentencing severity and appears to have succeeded; for most
serious crimes, the proportion of convicted offenders incarcerated and
their average minimum sentences before parole eligibility increased
after the guidelines took effect (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentenc-
ing 1987, table 19). In Delaware, published monitoring data are less
detailed than elsewhere but, as figure 2 shows, after the guidelines took
effect the proportion of violent offenders among Delaware prisoners
increased and the proportion of nonviolent offenders decreased (Gebel-
ein 1991, p. 12). The U.S. Sentencing Commission also attempted to
increase sentencing severity by decreasing use of probation, increasing
the proportion of offenders incarcerated, and greatly increasing sen-
tence lengths; it succeeded on all counts (U.S. Sentencing Commission
1991b; Tonry 1993b).
The effects of changes in sentencing patterns appear to vary with
the abruptness of the new policies' departure from past practices.
Where that change is modest, as in the initial guidelines in Pennsylva-
nia and Minnesota, practices appear likely to revert to their prior pat-
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FIG. 2.-Composition of Delaware's incarcerated population before and after effective
date of SENTAC guidelines. Source: Gebelein (1991).
terns once the system has settled down. Where the change is sharp
and the new sentencing policies are much more severe than past prac-
tice, there has been less evidence of reversion.
Published analyses are available from three jurisdictions-
Minnesota, Washington, and the federal system-that describe system
acceptance or rejection of substantial changes to sentencing policies.
In Minnesota, amidst the commission's general policy of emphasizing
prison use for violent offenses and deemphasizing its use for property
offenses, major controversies included decisions to reduce the use of
imprisonment for property offenders and to prescribe lengthy prison
terms for sex offenders, especially for intrafamilial sex offenders. Frase
(1993a) tells both stories; in each, the commission's policy changes were
resisted.
Prosecutors actively resisted the policy decision to preclude impris-
onment for most property offenders. Under the initial guidelines, mi-
nor property offenders were prison bound only if they had accumu-
lated many prior convictions. A common prosecutorial strategy, in
response, was to build criminal histories. A shoplifter might, for exam-
ple, contrary to an earlier practice of taking a plea to one offense with
other charges being dismissed, be required to plead guilty to five of-
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fenses; the next time that offender was convicted of shoplifting, his
five prior convictions would produce a presumptive prison sentence.
The commission responded by changing the criminal history scoring
rules so as to offset the bargaining pattern change (Parent 1988). This
time prosecutors responded by insisting on guilty pleas to multiple
charges and arguing that the sentence for the last contemporaneous
plea must take account of the defendant's minutes-earlier prior convic-
tions. In State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W. 2d 478 (1981), the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld that practice and the prosecutors won. By
1983, the proportion of property offenders imprisoned had risen to
preguidelines levels and continued to rise through 1989 (Frase 1993a,
p. 38).
The intrafamilial sex offense story is less tortured, but the moral is
no less clear. Responding to heightened public concern, the commis-
sion prescribed prison sentences for most persons convicted of sexual
offenses, regardless of the offender's prior record. Child sex abuse cases
are especially complicated because of practitioners' recognition of many
offenders' psychopathology, concern for maintaining households, and
fear of making children feel guilty for having caused a parent's impris-
onment and broken up the family. As a result, departure rates for child
sex abuse cases have been high throughout the guidelines period and
in 1987, despite the guidelines presumption of lengthy prison terms,
the imprisonment rate for intrafamilial sex abuse cases was only 40
percent and the rate for nonfamilial statutory rape cases was only 58
percent (Frase 1993a). Frase's analysis does not demonstrate that sen-
tences for sex offenders did not increase; they did, for those offenders
for whom downward departures did not occur. Minnesota's sex-
offender policies thus increased disparities among persons convicted of
child sexual abuse offenses but, among those imprisoned, increased
the severity of penalties.
Boerner has shown how changes in guideline severity adopted in
Washington were quickly followed by increases in average sentence
severity. Because criminal code changes that increase penalties must
be made prospectively, for constitutional reasons, during transition
periods grandfathered cases must be sentenced under the earlier, less
harsh, standards and new cases under the new standards, allowing for
examination of the effects of the new standards. Figure 3 shows sen-
tencing patterns from 1988 to 1992 for second degree burglaries com-
mitted before and after the effective date of guideline amendments
that divided second degree burglary into residential and nonresidential
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types and increased penalties for each. Average sentences for residen-
tial burglary increased substantially, while sentences for grandfathered
cases (both nonresidential and residential) increased only slightly. Fig-
ure 4 shows comparable data for sentencing in first degree statutory
rape and first degree "rape of child" cases from 1987 to 1992, which
offenses Boerner writes are comparable because code changes in 1988
that increased penalties also relabeled statutory rape as "rape of a child;
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the behavior covered by each of the degrees is essentially the same"
(Boerner 1993, p. 25). Sentences for grandfathered cases under the
original 1984 guidelines fluctuated but remained essentially the same
through 1992, while cases sentenced under the 1988 guideline revision
were substantially higher.
Boerner gives many such examples, all of which tend to demonstrate
that changes in guidelines sentence severity were quickly followed by
increases in the severity of sentences for affected offenses. As always,
the data tell less than an omniscient observer would want to know.
Because Boerner's data are average sentences received by incarcerated
offenders sentenced for the designated offenses, it is impossible to
know whether and how often the harsher sentences were avoided by
plea bargains in which the defendant was allowed to plead guilty to a
less serious offense than would have happened before the guideline
revisions took effect. It would, however, require an unrealistically cyn-
ical hypothesis thereby to explain away all or most of the apparent
increases in sentencing severity, leaving the conclusion that Washing-
ton's guideline changes did indeed significantly increase sentencing
severity.
If the Washington data leave any doubt that sentencing policy
changes through guidelines can alter sentencing practices, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission experience should remove that doubt. The
commission chose greatly to increase the proportion of offenders sen-
tenced to imprisonment and greatly to increase the average lengths of
prison sentences. It succeeded in both objectives.
The commission's evaluation showed that overall the percentage of
convicted federal offenders sentenced to probation declined from 52
percent in late 1984 to 35 percent in June 1990. The commission iso-
lates only three offenses for separate study (drugs, robbery, and "eco-
nomic offenses"); use of nonincarcerative sentences fell sharply for
each.
Reduction in the use of probation as a sentence was even greater
than the commission reports. The commission's evaluation overstates
the use of probation, presumably by counting split sentences that in-
clude some period of incarceration as a condition of "probation." The
commission's 1991 annual report (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1992b,
table 23) shows that only 14.5 percent of offenders in 1991 received
"probation only" sentences. Although the evaluation does not report
probation-only sentences before the guidelines took effect, some insight
can be gained by comparing 1985 probation-only rates for selected
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offenses with 1991 rates. The 1985 data were reported by the commis-
sion in 1987. The first number in each of the following pairs is the
1985 probation-only rate; the second is the 1991 rate: robbery-18
percent, 0.3 percent; fraud-59 percent, 22 percent; immigration-41
percent, 16.8 percent (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1987, p. 68;
1992b, table 3).
The severity of prison sentences likewise increased. The commission
reports that the mean "expected to be served" sentence for all offenders
increased from twenty-four months in July 1984 to forty-six months
in June 1990 (1991b, p. 378). Prison sentences for drug offenses in-
creased by 248 percent from 1984 to 1990 and from an average sixty
months for robbery in 1984 to seventy-eight months in 1990. Although
the commission's evaluation does not discuss other offenses, most of-
fense categories would probably demonstrate stark increases.
The record, though not uncomplicated, seems to show that commis-
sions through their policy choices can alter sentencing patterns sub-
stantially. That this can happen despite deep judicial dislike of the
new policies is illustrated by the federal experience in which several
judges have resigned rather than impose sentences they believe are
unduly harsh, in which a California judge in tears imposed a lengthy
sentence because the guidelines required it and then resigned, and in
which one not unrepresentative appellate judge voted to uphold an
aggregate 140 years imprisonment for four defendants, only to observe,
"these sentences defy reason, but as I have already noted-such is our
system" (Bright 1993).
4. Racial and Gender Differences. Every sentencing commission has
included reduction or elimination of racial and gender discrimination
in sentencing among its goals (e.g., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1980), and most claim to a considerable extent to have
succeeded. The Minnesota commission's three-year evaluation con-
cluded that racial differences in sentencing declined under guidelines;
nonetheless, minority defendants were likelier than whites to be im-
prisoned when the presumptive sentence prescribed non-state-
imprisonment, minority defendants received longer sentences than
similarly categorized whites, and men received longer prison sentences
than similarly categorized women (Knapp 1984, p. 61). Miethe and
Moore (1985, pp. 352-55), using the same data but more sophisticated
statistical techniques, agreed that overall racial and gender differences
declined under guidelines. Frase (1993a, pp. 23-31), using the commis-
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sion's monitoring data through 1989, also agreed that racial and gender
differences diminished compared with preguidelines practices but
painted a more complex picture. Controlling for current offense and
criminal history, women continued to receive gentler handling; they
were less than half as likely to be subject to aggravated departures and
more likely to benefit from mitigated departures. Black defendants had
equal or higher aggravated departure rates compared with whites in
each of five years studied and lower mitigated departure rates in all
five years.
Washington's evaluation revealed similar patterns. The initial evalu-
ation found an overall decline in racial differences in sentencing but
that "substantial racial and gender disparity was found in the use of
sentencing alternatives"; whites were almost twice as likely as blacks
to benefit from special mitigating provisions for first-time and some
sex offenders (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1987, p. 59). In a ten-year review of Washington sentencing reforms,
although concluding that racial and gender differences had diminished,
the commission in 1992 acknowledged "significant gender and ethnic
differences in the application of options" to incarceration (Washington
State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1992b, p. 12).
The Oregon racial data from the first fifteen months' guidelines expe-
rience are difficult to disentangle because most analyses compare
whites and "minorities," a category that includes blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, and Native Americans, groups whose patterns of criminality
vary substantially. In addition, most of the data are presented in tabu-
lar form without controls or multivariate analyses to take account of
systematic differences in the kinds of crimes and criminal histories
that characterize various groups. Noting that the data are crude, the
following can be observed. First, the overall probability of state incar-
ceration for whites fell from 17 percent before guidelines to 12 percent
under guidelines. For minorities, the rate fell slightly from 23.9 percent
to 23 percent (with six-point decreases for blacks and Asians and three-
and five-point increases for Native Americans and Hispanics; Ashford
and Mosbaek [1991], p. 47). Whites were slightly less likely than mi-
nority defendants to receive upward dispositional departures, slightly
more likely to receive downward dispositional departures, and much
more likely to benefit from an "optional probation" alternatives pro-
gram (Ashford and Mosbaek 1991, pp. 49-52). As whites are to minor-
ity defendants in Oregon sentencing, so women are to men: women
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were less likely to receive upward departures, more likely to receive
downward departures, and more likely to be sentenced to optional
probation.
Curiously, although the U.S. Sentencing Commission's self-
evaluation and the GAO reanalyses of the commission's data involved
much more sophisticated data-analytic methods than any of the state
evaluations, the research design precluded any overall conclusions
about racial and gender disparities. The commission's basic study,
recall, was of disparity before and under guidelines using the commis-
sion's offense severity and criminal history schemes as the measure of
consistency, but focusing on eight categories of cases involving small
numbers in each category. As a result, the rote conclusion (U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission 1991a, pp. 302, 324) was that "cell sizes were
inadequate to test or no significant relationships were found with re-
spect to ... race, gender, age." Exclusion from the analysis of depar-
tures for "substantial assistance to the government" leaves open the
possibility that those mitigated sentences are skewed in terms of race
or gender. In addition, as with the general disparity analysis, there is
no basis for generalizing from the specific offenses the commission
analyzed to federal offenders generally (U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice 1992, p. 64).
Because of the small sample sizes, the numbers of mitigated depar-
tures were insignificant, and no meaningful analyses of race and gender
effects in departures could be made. In relation to disparities within
the guidelines (i.e., whether some racial or gender groups are likelier
to receive sentences at the top or bottom of the guideline ranges), the
commission found that "race was found to be statistically significant
across all offense categories [but] . . . only slight variations between
sentencing of black and white offenders were found." However,
"women were statistically more likely to receive sentences at the bot-
tom of the range" (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991a, p. 324).
The GAO, in a more sophisticated analysis, concluded that "blacks
were more likely than whites to receive sentences at the bottom or top
of the guidelines range rather than in the middle" and that "females
were twice as likely (i.e., 1.91 times as likely, to be exact) as males to
receive sentences at the bottom rather than in the middle of the range"
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1992, p. 92).
The commission somewhat formalistically disagreed with the
GAO's depiction of sentencing differences within guidelines as dispar-
ity, arguing that Congress authorized guideline ranges in which the
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maximum sentence was 25 percent longer than the minimum and ac-
cordingly by definition there could be no "unwarranted disparities,"
on racial or any other grounds, among sentences within applicable
ranges (U.S. General Accounting Office 1992). Probably the fairest
summary of the federal evaluations is that they are inconclusive on
the effect of guidelines on racial disparities and consistent with state
evaluations in finding gender disparities in favor of women.
The available evidence thus shows that guidelines have ameliorated
but not eliminated racial and gender disparities in sentencing and that
whites more often than nonwhites, and women than men, benefit from
alternatives to incarceration and mitigated departures from guidelines.
The difficulties in all this are that racial sentencing comparisons are
confounded by systematic socioeconomic differences between races
and that both racial and gender comparisons are confounded by group
differences in criminality. Because blacks for reasons both of racial
discrimination and social disadvantage tend to be likelier than whites to
participate in common law crimes and to accumulate criminal records,
guidelines based primarily on the current crime and the past criminal
record in the nature of things treat blacks more severely than whites
(and a parallel pattern distinguishes men from women). These differ-
ences in crime participation and criminal history accumulation are well
known and are illustrated in tables 7 and 8 from Oregon's fifteen-month
evaluation. Classification of offenders by ethnicity and criminal history
("A" is highest, "I" is lowest) shows more blacks than whites, and
more men than women, with extensive criminal histories.
In order to combat racial disparities in sentencing, most sentencing
commissions have forbidden judges to give weight in sentencing to
socioeconomic factors such as education, employment, and family sta-
bility which are known to be correlated with race, in order not system-
atically to disadvantage members of minority groups. Unfortunately,
the "neutral" criteria of current offense and criminal history have the
same effect. Since most guideline disparity analyses control for crimi-
nal history, they define away much of the differentially adverse sen-
tencing experienced by members of minority groups as "not disparity."
5. Prison Populations. The Oregon, Washington, Minnesota, and
federal commissions operated under enabling legislation which directed
them to give substantial consideration to the impact of their guidelines
on correctional resources, which was generally interpreted to refer to
prison beds and capacity. The federal commission ignored that charge,
despite unambiguous language in Section 9 9 4(g) of the Sentencing Re-
TABLE 7
Criminal History Classification by Race, Oregon (in Percent)
Race
Criminal
History Native
Category White Hispanic Black American Asian Total
A .5 .4 3.9 .8 .0 .7
B 1.8 1.3 4.9 1.7 .0 1.9
C 5.6 3.2 12.7 9.9 6.9 5.9
D 3.1 2.0 6.0 11.6 .0 3.3
E 8.7 3.6 8.3 7.4 .0 7.9
F 13.4 9.4 13.0 22.3 10.3 12.9
G 21.0 17.4 15.3 18.2 20.7 20.0
H 14.9 9.1 11.7 17.4 3.4 13.8
1 30.9 53.6 24.4 10.7 58.6 33.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 4,300 834 386 121 29 5,670
SoURcE.-Ashford and Mosbaek (1991), p. 49.
NOTE.-Cases where criminal history is missing have been excluded; p < .0001.
Criminal History
TABLE 8
Classification by Gender, Oregon (in Percent)
Criminal Gender
History
Category Male Female Total
A .9 .0 .7
B 2.1 .4 1.9
C 6.7 1.4 5.9
D 3.7 2.0 3.4
E 8.7 4.2 8.1
F 13.3 12.4 13.2
G 20.3 17.5 19.9
H 13.3 16.7 13.8
I 31.0 45.4 33.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 5,200 910 6,110
SouRcE.-Ashford and Mosback (1991), p. 56.
NoTE.-Cases where criminal history is missing have been excluded; p < .0001.
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form Act of 1984: "The sentencing guidelines prescribed under this
chapter shall be formulated to minimize the likelihood that the federal
prison population will exceed the capacity of the federal prisons," and
promulgated guidelines that were predicted to triple the federal prison
population within a decade (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1987, chap.
7). The other states heeded their charges and, rarities among American
states, as figure 5 shows, managed to restrain population growth and
hold prison populations within capacity for extended periods (and Ore-
gon to the present). In Minnesota and Washington, sensational crimes
in each state in 1989 provoked anticrime hysteria, and the legislatures
increased penalties for many crimes; both prison populations thereafter
rose rapidly (Frase 1993b; Lieb 1993).
Nonetheless, the experience in Washington, Oregon, and Minnesota
shows that sentencing commissions and their guidelines can adopt pol-
icy approaches that treat prison beds as scarce and expensive resources
and that those policies can succeed in constraining prison population
growth and associated public spending.
B. Effectiveness as Administrative Agencies
Were there not a federal sentencing commission, no one would ques-
tion that Judge Frankel's proposed new approach to formulation of
sentencing policy has been markedly successful, both substantively
and institutionally. In 1978, just a few years after the appearance of
Judge Frankel's book, Criminal Sentences: Law without Order, and long
before passage of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Minne-
sota and Pennsylvania enacted sentencing commission legislation and,
in 1980 and 1982, respectively, guidelines took effect. Since then,
guidelines developed by sentencing commissions have taken effect in
Washington, Oregon, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kansas. Commis-
sions are at work in Ohio, North Carolina, and elsewhere.
Of guidelines now in effect, those in Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Oregon have been in operation long enough that
evidence concerning their operation is available. The preceding subsec-
tion showed that commissions have in significant degree achieved many
of their substantive policy goals. State commissions have also achieved
Judge Frankel's institutional purposes. They have established and sus-
tained specialized technical competence. In all four states, the commis-
sions have survived to serve as their state's principal forum for sentenc-
ing policy proposals. Each has developed a monitoring system and has
from time to time considered or implemented guidelines changes to
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respond to implementation problems revealed by monitoring pro-
grams. Each conducts regular training sessions. Each publishes annual
statistical reports. Minnesota's commission in 1984 prepared the most
sophisticated evaluation of a state sentencing initiative ever published
(Knapp 1984). All four are wrestling with current policy issues. Penn-
sylvania, in particular, is now considering a major overhaul of its guide-
lines and some of their underlying policy premises (Pennsylvania Com-
mission on Sentencing 1993, pp. 3-7). Oregon and Washington are
both working on guidelines for misdemeanants and for non-state-
prison-bound felons (Bogan 1991; Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1992b). Minnesota has been working for years
on nonincarceration guidelines, drug-offense policy, and day fines
(e.g., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1991b, 1992).
The state commissions have served to some degree to insulate sen-
tencing policy from short-term emotionalism and law-and-order slo-
ganeering. Sentencing policies did eventually change in both Minne-
sota and Washington to reflect the law-and-order politics of the 1990s;
perhaps it is no coincidence that penalties in both states increased
substantially in 1989, only months after Willie Horton's voter-
galvanizing appearance in the 1988 presidential campaign. In Minne-
sota, the anticrime reaction was so strong that the legislature amended
the enabling legislation to make "public safety" the primary factor in
setting sentencing standards and, while allowing some role for resource
concerns, provided that resources should no longer warrant substan-
tial consideration (Frase 1993b).
No legislative delegation of rule-making authority to administrative
agencies can forever or completely insulate policy from partisan politi-
cal influence, nor should it. Powerful and determined political forces
can overrule an agency's policies directly through legislation or indi-
rectly through informal political pressure or appointment of new com-
missioners committed to different policies. In the short term, however,
especially in the face of less powerful or less determined opposition,
administrative agencies can buffer policy from episodic emotions and
sometimes can protect elected officials from constituent pressures. Es-
pecially in the past dozen years in the United States, criminal justice
policies have been highly contentious. Political pressures and emotions
tend to support increased penalties for currently topical crimes and to
provide little support for comprehensive unemotional approaches to
crime control policies. Where the political will exists to try to buffer
sentencing policies from short-term emotions, the experience in the
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states shows that commissions can provide that buffer-so long as the
supportive political will survives.
The state sentencing commissions also adopted comprehensive sys-
tems approaches to sentencing policy. Minnesota, Washington, and
Oregon all fitted their sentencing policies to available (or foreseeable)
prison resources, taking the theretofore unknown but unassailable posi-
tion that responsible policy-making requires that states face up to the
programmatic and financial implications of the sentencing policies they
adopt. Policy can be tailored to fit resources, or resources can be ex-
panded to meet projected needs; one way or the other a "resource
constraint" policy requires conscious and responsible decision making,
a practice conspicuously absent in the 1980s in most American states,
where punishments were repeatedly raised without regard to resources
and foreseeably resulted in unprecedented prison overcrowding and
federal court intervention. As a result of the resource constraint policy,
each of the commissions had consciously to reduce penalties for some
crimes when pressures arose to increase penalties for others.
To this point, the experience of the federal and state commissions
is institutionally similar. Where the experience differs is in the quality
of the guidelines the state commissions produced, their successful ef-
forts to win (at least grudging) support from judges and other prac-
titioners, their success in achieving an institutional esprit among com-
mission staff, and their abilities to insulate policy from politics at least
for a time (e.g., Tonry 1991, 1993b). Three points of difference stand
out.
First, unlike the federal guidelines, which remain deeply unpopular
with judges and lawyers six years after their effective date, the guide-
lines in Washington, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Oregon
are generally supported by criminal court practitioners. In no state is
there heated debate about the guidelines' desirability and legitimacy
and in no state is there organized opposition to them.
Second, as noted earlier, until legislative changes in Washington
and Minnesota led to toughened guidelines, those states successfully
maintained prison populations within available capacity and main-
tained lower than average incarceration rate increases, thereby avoiding
out-of-control corrections spending and federal court intervention. In
Oregon, population control continues. By contrast, the U.S. commis-
sion ignored its statutory directive to link policy to resources and, 'as
a result, the federal prison population grew by 60 percent between
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year-end 1987 and mid-1992, and the federal prisons in 1992 were
operating at 158 percent of capacity (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1992b).
Third, unlike the state commissions, the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion suffered from internal dissension, high staff turnover, ineffective
management, and political infighting. The state commissions have been
remarkably stable. The Pennsylvania commission's director, appointed
in 1978, remained in place early in 1993, and several of the senior staff
remained with the commission for ten years or longer. The current
director of the Minnesota commission was promoted from within and
has worked with the commission for more than a decade. The Wash-
ington commission's director was its initial research director, and the
initial director remains active in sentencing policy deliberations. The
director of the Oregon Criminal Justice Council, under the auspices of
which Oregon's guidelines were developed, has held that position since
before that state's guidelines were developed.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission experience has been less stable
and less harmonious. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1990),
when asked by the Congress to assess the commission's management
and operations, found "organizational disarray." In four years the com-
mission had four staff directors and one interim director and was with-
out a research director for one and one-half years. "According to for-
mer staff directors, it was difficult to manage in an environment where
they could not maintain authority over staff because of commissioners'
involvement," the GAO observed. Moreover, "part of the problem has
been finding qualified candidates who would be willing to take the
[research director's] position, given perceptions that the working envi-
ronment is complicated by commissioner involvement and other mat-
ters" (p. 15). The May 1990 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter
reprints critical statements about the commission's management from
numerous agencies and spokesmen. Two members of the commission
and one ex officio member have resigned on principle over the commis-
sion's failures (Robinson 1987; Block 1989).
To be sure, not all state sentencing commissions have succeeded.
Some, like those in New York and South Carolina, developed guide-
lines but could not persuade legislatures to adopt them. In Pennsylva-
nia and Kansas, legislatures rejected initial sets of proposed guidelines,
and commissions came forth with less ambitious but salable successors.
In some states-for example, Florida-the guidelines are not well re-
spected and are of little influence (Florida Legislature 1991).
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If the controversies associated with the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, and the wisdom of its policies, are set aside, from a purely tech-
nical perspective even it can be seen as an institutional success. Suc-
cessful administrative agencies achieve and maintain specialized
competence concerning complex subjects (that is why they are created),
they have some degree of insulation from short-term political emotions
and pressures (that is why typically their members are appointed for
fixed terms and can only be removed for cause), and they can adopt
comprehensive and long-term approaches to policy-making (this also
is why they are created and why public funds are spent to develop
cadres of policy experts).
From that perspective, even the U.S. commission has been at least
a partial success. No one can doubt that it has achieved specialized
competence. Through its rule-making processes, it has proposed and
promulgated hundreds of changes to its guidelines, policy statements,
and supporting commentary in efforts to rein in what it sees as willfully
noncompliant judges and to fine-tune its policies. Through its monitor-
ing and evaluation staffs, it has assembled mountains of data and pub-
lished numerous annual and evaluation reports, at least some of which,
notably its report on mandatory penalties (1991a), demonstrate high
levels of technical competence and policy sophistication.
The commission has taken a comprehensive systems approach to
policy-making, as is evidenced by its efforts to devise guidelines for all
federal offenses, to monitor the guidelines' implementation, to counter-
balance the plea-bargaining strategies of prosecutors and defense coun-
sel, and to train probation officers to serve as guardians of the guide-
lines.
The most powerful evidence that the U.S. commission has suc-
ceeded institutionally is that federal sentencing practices have been
radically altered. No matter how misguided the guidelines and despite
their inability to win support from the people who must implement
them (which means they will fail in the long term), the guidelines have
succeeded in recasting federal sentencing. Sentencing patterns changed
as the commission intended: the proportion of cases sentenced to pro-
bation declined greatly, and average prison terms for many offenses
became longer.
Where Judge Frankel's model failed in the federal system was in
respect of political insulation. Most proponents of guidelines have seen
its one-step-removed-from-politics character as a great strength (e.g.,
Frankel and Orland 1984). The U.S. commission, by contrast, made
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no effort to insulate its policies from law-and-order politics and short-
term emotions. One sign of this is a repeated invocation by the commis-
sion of the "reduction of undue leniency" in sentencing as one of the
guidelines' primary objectives (1991a, p. i),8 even though the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 includes no equivalent language among its
enumerated statutory purposes (18 USCA § 3553[a][2]; 28 USCA,
chap. 58, § 991[b]). The commission apparently decided that the U.S.
Department of Justice and the most law-and-order members of the
U.S. Congress were its primary constituency, and it established and
attempted to enforce policies that pleased that constituency. This is
presumably why the commission ignored a statutory directive that it
should tie its policies to available correctional resources, 9 why it chose
to ignore a statutory presumption against incarceration of first offend-
ers not convicted of violent or other serious crimes,' 0 and why it re-
acted to harsh mandatory minimum penalty provisions for many drug
offenses by making the guidelines even harsher (e.g., Tonry 1992).
Thus the federal experience shows that, as an institution, a sentenc-
ing commission can operate much as do administrative agencies on
other subjects. The state experience supports that conclusion but also
shows that commissions can also develop successful sentencing policies
that win the support of practitioners, that tie policy to resource alloca-
tion, and that achieve substantively sound sentencing policies.
II. Issues Facing Commissions
For the foreseeable future, sentencing commissions are here to stay.
Their guidelines have been completely successful nowhere, in part
because there can be no consensus about the meaning of success. So
long as people have discussed punishment there have been major differ-
ences in perspective between those who see the criminal law and sen-
tencing primarily or exclusively as institutions concerned with alleged
offenders' moral culpability and those who see the criminal law and
8- See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Commission (1991a, p. i): "The goals of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 were to reduce unwarranted disparity, increase certainty and sever-
ity, and correct past patterns of undue leniency."
Section 994(g): "The Commission in promulgating guidelines ... shall take into
account the nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other services and facilities
available .... The sentencing guidelines prescribed under this chapter shall be formu-
lated to minimize the likelihood that the federal prison population will exceed the capac-
ity of the federal prisons."
10 Section 994(j): "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the general
appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which a
defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense."
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sentencing primarily as institutions concerned with prevention of crime
and maximization of public safety. Even without fundamental differ-
ences in punishment philosophy, differences in officials' perspectives
breed disagreements. Legislators and sentencing commissioners are
concerned with policy in the aggregate. If disparity reduction is the
goal, clear bright-line standards are the simplest to express and against
which to measure progress. Judges, lawyers, and defendants are con-
cerned with situationally just or appropriate penalties and often find
clear and simple standards arbitrary and simplistic. Disagreements
about punishment purposes and differences in perspective make it im-
possible to achieve perfect compliance with guidelines. Commissions
have, however, managed to make sentencing more accountable, more
consistent, and less disparate in its impact on minority group members,
and those are not small achievements.
As the sentencing commission enters its third decade, two sets of
policy issues must continue to be addressed. One set of issues poses
fundamental policy-making challenges-plea bargaining, intermediate
punishments, misdemeanor guidelines-that no commission has ade-
quately resolved. Another, however, involves issues on which there
has been slow but steady progress, on which commissions have gradu-
ally refined their approaches, and on which commissions have learned
from one another. This section sketches the contours of those issues.
Discussing them in detail would require another essay, and to my
knowledge there is no published literature (except, perhaps, Parent
[1988]). Interested readers, however, are invited to contact the commis-
sions listed in the Appendix. All have wrestled with these issues and
most have prepared, and are willing to share, staff or commission
reports on the policy rationales and considerations behind detailed pol-
icy choices.
A. Major Systemic Issues
Four major systemic issues affecting sentencing guidelines have
faced sentencing commissions from the outset. On one, the desirability
of tying sentencing policy and its projected operations to correctional
resources, there is slow but steady movement toward choosing to do
so. Other major systemic issues-controlling prosecutorial discretion
under guidelines and developing guidelines for misdemeanors and for
nonincarcerative penalties-have been discussed by every sentencing
commission but nowhere have they as yet been adequately resolved
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(unless doing nothing or virtually nothing is seen as adequate reso-
lution).
1. Guidelines for Noncustodial Sanctions and Misdemeanors. Although
no commission in its initial years attempted to develop guidelines for
nonincarcerative sentences, in part because development of incarcera-
tion guidelines was challenge enough, in part because of the lack of
community-based punishments in most jurisdictions, and in part be-
cause no one knew how to do it, commissions today are at work in
many states on proposals to integrate intermediate and noncustodial
penalties into guidelines and to devise systems of interchangeability
between prison and nonprison sanctions.
There has been considerable conceptual progress, but little practical
policy-making, since the Minnesota commission declined a legislative
invitation (Laws of Minnesota for 1978, chap. 723, § 9[5][2]) to devise
nonincarceration guidelines: "The sentencing guidelines promulgated
by the commission may also establish appropriate sentences for prison-
ers for whom imprisonment is not proper. Any [such] guidelines ...
shall make specific reference to noninstitutional sanctions including but
not limited to the following: payment of fines, day fines, restitution,
community work orders, work release programs in local facilities, com-
munity based residential and nonresidential programs, incarceration in
a local correctional facility, and probation and the conditions thereof."
In the event, the Minnesota commission's guidelines created presump-
tions as to who went to prison (roughly 20 percent of convicted felons)
and for how long, but set no presumptions for sentences for nonimpris-
onment or local jail sanctions for felons or for sentences of any kind
for misdemeanants.
Since then, each commission has considered misdemeanor and non-
imprisonment guidelines, and a few have taken small steps. Three
basic approaches have been considered. The first is to create "punish-
ment units" in which all sanctions can be expressed. If guidelines, for
example, set "120 punishment units" as the presumptive sentence, a
judge could impose any combination of sanctions that represented 120
units. Oregon's guidelines specify presumptive sentences for many of-
fenders in punishment units (Bogan 1990, 1991), but do not provide for
how the units are to be calculated. This has been the critical problem in
every jurisdiction that has considered the punishment unit approach.
Preoccupation with prison sentences as the standard punishment has
so far stymied development of the concept. Jurisdictions have typically
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begun with prison time and then attempted to specify punitively equiv-
alent nonprison sentences. In a number of jurisdictions, for example,
one day's imprisonment has been made equivalent to one, or even
three, days' community service. This limits substitution of noncusto-
dial for custodial penalties to very short prison terms. The best-known
American community service program (McDonald 1986) and the na-
tional policy in England and Wales (Pease 1985), respectively, set 70
and 240 hours as the maximum enforceable length of a community
service sentence. At three days' community service to one day's incar-
ceration, community service would be exchangeable for three to ten
days' incarceration.
Besides the difficulty in reaching agreement about exchange rates
between custodial and noncustodial penalties, two other problems have
impeded policy development (Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 8). Few
American jurisdictions have large numbers of well-managed, credible,
noncustodial penalties in operation, which makes it difficult to promul-
gate guidelines premised on their availability. In an era of constrained
public resources, it has been difficult obtaining new money to create
new programs (even though diversion of prison-bound offenders to
community penalties should in the long run conserve public funds).
The second, related, problem is that county governments in most
American states pay for all or most noncustodial corrections programs.
This means both that available programs differ substantially between
counties within a state and that new programs must be paid for from
county revenues (or from state funds, but in tight times, states are no
more eager to appropriate new money than are counties).
The second approach is to create different presumptive bands within
sentencing guideline grids-(strong presumptive "in"; weak presump-
tive "in"; weak presumptive "out"; strong presumptive "out")-and to
allow judges to create individualized noncustodial punishments that
take account of those presumptions. The D.C. Superior Court Sen-
tencing Guidelines Commission (1987) first proposed such a system,
and Pennsylvania more recently has adopted one. The problem with
this approach is that it authorizes use of noncustodial penalties and
contemplates some interchangeability between custodial and noncusto-
dial penalties but sets no standards for their use when they are autho-
rized (Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3).
The third approach is simply to specify equivalent custodial and
noncustodial penalties and to authorize judges to impose them in the
alternative. Washington's commission did this (Boerner 1985) and later
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proposed a more extensive system (Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1992b, pp. 19-23), which the legislature did
not adopt. Like the punishment unit proposals, so far the equivalency
approaches have been unable to overcome the psychological and politi-
cal pressures to make "equivalent" punishments as subjectively burden-
some as prison, which limits their use to the most minor offenses and
offenders. Advice from academics (Wasik and von Hirsch 1988; Morris
and Tonry 1990, chap. 4) has not proven enormously helpful.
2. Tying Sentencing Policy to Corrections Resources. The wisdom of
the Minnesota-Washington-Oregon decision to tie sentencing policies
to corrections resources has become ever clearer, and other states are
beginning to follow suit. Pennsylvania's commission, for example,
which initially chose not to take correctional resources into account in
devising its guidelines, is reconsidering that decision (Kramer 1992).
The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission
(1993) and the Texas Punishment Standards Commission (Reynolds
1993) have proposed that their states adopt policies of tying sentencing
policy to correctional resources. The Kansas commission proposed,
and the legislature accepted, an "early warning system" approach in
which the commissioner of corrections would certify an impending
resource problem and the sentencing commission would review current
practices and make recommendations for changes to the legislature
(Kansas Sentencing Commission 1991; Gottlieb 1993).
3. Controlling Plea Bargaining. No jurisdiction has as yet devised
an adequate system for controlling plea bargaining under a sentencing
guidelines system. Washington State came closest. Aware of criticisms
that guidelines for sentencing shift discretion to prosecutors, the Wash-
ington legislature authorized its sentencing commission to promulgate
statewide charging and plea-bargaining standards. Because of concern
that strong standards would be unenforceable (or invite judicial scru-
tiny of prosecutorial discretion that prosecutors adamantly opposed)
and opposition on the merits from prosecutors, the commission devel-
oped weak aspirational standards (Boerner 1985, app. 6).
Sentence bargains, if allowed, can undermine any system of guide-
lines (Alschuler 1978). Charge (or "fact") bargaining in systems based
on conviction offenses like Minnesota's or Oregon's enable plea bar-
gaining lawyers to pick the applicable guideline range and thereby
greatly to limit the judge's options. A number of proposals have been
made for regulating plea bargaining under guidelines (Schulhofer 1980;
Tonry and Coffee 1987). One is to provide an explicit percentage or
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other mechanical sentence discount for defendants who plead guilty
(Gottfredson, Wilkins, and Hoffman 1978). The U.S. Sentencing
Commission in effect does this by allowing a two- or three-level sen-
tence reduction for "acceptance of responsibility" evidenced by a guilty
plea. The most radical proposal has been to adopt "real offense" sen-
tencing in which penalties are based not on the defendants' conviction
offense but on his "actual behavior." Only the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission has adopted a real-offense system. The U.S. commission
adopted its "relevant conduct" approach to sentencing in order to offset
plea bargaining's influence (Wilkins and Steer 1990); by requiring
judges at sentencing to take account of uncharged behavior, and behav-
ior alleged in dropped or acquitted charges, the commission's approach
raises difficult issues of principle (Lear 1993; Reitz 1993). In addition,
that approach has not managed to avoid increased prosecutorial influ-
ence. Many judges argue that the guidelines have shifted power to the
prosecutor (Federal Courts Study Committee 1990; Heaney 1991).
B. Evolutionary Issues
The earliest guidelines, it is easy to forget, represented a radical
departure from the indeterminate sentencing systems that they dis-
placed. Before guidelines, judges had almost complete discretion to
impose any lawful sentence, and parole boards could set any release
date between the minimum parole eligibility date and the maximum
set by the judge (often three times the minimum). That some policy
choices made by the early commissions were cautious and others in
retrospect relatively crude should be no surprise. In this brief section,
I identify a number of issues on which there has been gradual move-
ment in some states toward more refined policy choices.
1. Scaling Offenses. In early guideline systems, commissions for the
most part stayed very close to statutory definitions of offenses, however
broadly defined. As time has passed, commissions have partitioned
statutory offense definitions into subcategories of different severity.
The Pennsylvania commission, for example, has recently reconsidered
its offense severity rankings and its subdivisions of crimes. The ex-
treme case is the U.S. Commission (see table 4) which has added
numerous extrastatutory elements to its system of offense scaling.
2. Criminal Histories. The earliest guidelines systems used broad
generic criminal history measures. In Minnesota, for example, every
prior felony conviction was given one "point," every prison misde-
meanor one-fourth point, and every prior gross misdemeanor one-half
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point. More recent systems, including revisions to Minnesota's, are
subtler. Some give greater weight to prior violent than to prior prop-
erty convictions. Some cross tabulate so that a prior violent conviction
weighs more heavily for a current violent conviction than for a current
nonviolent conviction. Some weight prior convictions in relation to
their severity under the guidelines system's offense severity scaling
for current convictions. In similar fashion, guidelines commissions are
becoming more subtle in their chronological weighing of past crimes,
tending more often to build in express "decay" provisions in which
convictions prior to some date (e.g., five or ten years before the current
crime) are no longer taken into account.
There are numerous other issues, of course, on which policy think-
ing continues to evolve. These include such things as the handling of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the number of offense levels
in a guidelines grid, the relative location of particular crimes in offense
severity rankings, and the development of special procedures and rules
for regularly recurring policy issues presented by sex abuse cases, first
offenders, and drug cases.
III. The Future of the Sentencing Commission
The commissions that Judge Frankel proposed have shown that they
can achieve much of what he had in mind. They can attain and sustain
specialized it,. .tional competence of a variety of kinds. They can
develop and implement comprehensive, jurisdiction-wide standards for
sentences. Their guidelines can reduce sentencing disparities, diminish
racial and gender differences, and help jurisdictions link their criminal
justice policies to their criminal justice budgets. That is on the bright
side.
Commissions have limits as policy tools. There is evidence that,
after the enthusiasms and satisfactions of innovation have passed, insti-
tutional hardening of the arteries can set in and commissions can lose
their influence and lapse into passivity (e.g., Knapp 1987, pp. 127-41).
Commissions are premised in part on belief in norms of instrumental
rationality and empirically informed policy-making. When the political
environment is such that elected officials insist on treating criminal
justice policy-making primarily as symbolic politics, as happened in
New York (Griset 1991) and the federal system (von Hirsch 1988) and
with Pennsylvania's first set of proposed guidelines (Martin 1984),
there is little that commissions can do to resist in the long run. In the
short run, as the success of Minnesota's, Oregon's, and Washington's
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commissions at defying the national trends toward increased use of
imprisonment indicates, commissions can resist the politicization of
criminal justice policy. In both Washington and Minnesota, perhaps
because prison populations began to climb after get-tough guidelines
amendments were enacted in the late eighties, legislators have begun
to have second thoughts and to look for ways to regain the policy
rationality their guidelines systems once had (Frase 1993b; Lieb 1993).
This overview of experience with sentencing commissions paints a
partial picture and relies on literatures that more often support hypoth-
eses than answer questions. In part, this is because so few evaluations
have been carried out. With the exception of one series of outside
evaluations of Minnesota's guidelines (e.g., Miethe and Moore 1985,
1987; Moore and Miethe 1986), which relied largely on the Minnesota
commission's data, and the GAO's (1992) federal analysis, all of the
evaluations to date have been internal efforts carried out by permanent
staff. This has two obvious consequences. The commissions have a
predictable institutional self-interest in establishing the success of their
policies. The extreme instance is the U.S. commission's institutional
defensiveness and distortion. Its self-evaluation defined disparity in a
self-serving way that was foreordained to demonstrate success, evi-
dence was presented in the most favorable possible light, and imple-
mentation problems were attributed not to the lack of wisdom in the
commission's policies but to stubborn resistance of judges (e.g., U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1991b, pp. 419-20). The second, and more
common, problem is that ongoing commission budgets tend not to be
adequate to support sophisticated evaluations. The only data available
for analysis are routinely collected monitoring data which are limited
in coverage and may not be comprehensive (in Oregon's fifteen-month
evaluation, e.g., reporting forms had been filed for only 74 percent of
cases sentenced under the guidelines; Ashford and Mosbaek [1991], p.
x). Funds are not likely to be available to hire research consultants
and supplementary staff to carry out the analysis. Minnesota's justly
celebrated three-year evaluation was made possible only by grants from
the National Institute of Corrections and the MacArthur Foundation,
which supported supplementary data collection and paid for specialist
research staff (Knapp 1984).
Thus, for a number of reasons, there are severe limitations inherent
in having commissions evaluate their own handiwork. To date, how-
ever, with the exception of the Miethe and Moore and GAO studies,
and recent reanalyses of commission data by Frase in Minnesota (1991,
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1993a) and Boerner in Washington (1993), there have been no outside
empirical assessments. With the exception of the federally funded self-
evaluation by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (and the GAO follow-
up), the federal government, including its research agencies, has not
funded a single evaluation of sentencing commissions or their guide-
lines for nearly a decade, which seems a pity when so many states
have tried, or are trying, to recast their sentencing policies and prac-
tices with the help of sentencing commissions.
Twenty years on, at least in an American context, sentencing com-
missions and their guidelines have proven themselves as the most effec-
tive prescription thus far offered for the ills of lawlessness, arbitrari-
ness, disparity, and discrimination that were widely believed to
characterize indeterminate sentencing.
Perhaps in time private and public funding agencies will realize that
the states' experiments with sentencing reform are continuing and will
provide the financial support that is needed to help states better under-
stand where they have been and where they are going.
APPENDIX
Most commissions are willing to share materials with interested observers and
to answer questions. The names and mailing addresses of the major commis-
sions at the time of writing were:
Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission (SENTAC)
State Office Building
820 French Street
Wilmington, Del. 19801
Kansas Sentencing Commission
Jayhawk Tower
700 Jackson, Suite 501
Topeka, Kans. 66603
Louisiana Sentencing Commission
2121 Wooddale Blvd.
Baton Rouge, La. 70806
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
The Meridian National Bank Building
205 Aurora Avenue
Suite 205
St. Paul, Minn. 55103
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North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission
P.O. Box 2472
Raleigh, N.C. 27602
Oregon Criminal Justice Council
School of Urban and Public Affairs
632 SW Hall Street, Room 314
P.O. Box 751
Portland State University
Portland, Oreg. 97207
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
P.O. Box 1200
State College, Pa. 16801
United States Sentencing Commission
One Columbus Circle NE
Suite 2-500 South Lobby
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission
421 So. Capitol Way, Suite 303
P.O. Box 40927
Olympia, Wash. 98504-0927
Wisconsin Sentencing Commission
Suite 701
2 East Mifflin Street
Madison, Wis. 53703
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